With the growing intolerance to failures within systems, the issue of fault diagnosis has become ever prevalent. Information concerning these possible failures can help to minimise the disruption to the functionality of the system by allowing quick rectification. Traditional approaches to fault diagnosis within engineering systems have focused on sequential testing procedures and real time mechanisms. Both methods have been predominantly limited to single fault causes. Latest approaches also consider the issue of multiple faults in reflection to the characteristics of modern day systems designed for high reliability. In addition, a diagnostic capability is required in real time and for changeable system functionality. This paper focuses on two approaches which have been developed to cater for the demands of diagnosis within current engineering systems, namely application of the fault tree analysis technique and the method of digraphs. Both use a comparative approach to consider differences between actual system behaviour and that expected. The procedural guidelines are discussed for each method, with an experimental aircraft fuel system
used to test and demonstrate the features of the techniques. The effectiveness of the approaches are compared and their future potential highlighted.
INTRODUCTION
To maximise the operational functionality of any system or the effectiveness of any mission it is imperative that failures are detected as quickly as possible. The ability to diagnose a fault when it occurs is the first step to minimising this failure disruption time. Missions can be altered, systems reconfigured and spares ordered to enable the successful use of the resultant operative state.
Early methods dealing with diagnostic capability focused on identifying faults at a specific point in time using a series of testing procedures [1, 2] . A symptomfault relationship is evaluated, where a series of tests are used to filter to the actual fault cause. These approaches have been found to be effective in identifying single faults and also work well as an offline evaluation mechanism, i.e. for systems which have a period of inactivity where testing can occur at appropriate times without disruption. This allows identification of any faults prior to operation. However, the characteristics associated with modern day systems require real time diagnosis and to incorporate both adaptability and identification of multiple faults [3] . With systems and missions often involving changing conditions and operational modes, adaptability is key to perform diagnosis for the full mission or system life. To accommodate these system characteristics extensions to the early testing procedures have been developed [4] , in addition such tools as genetic algorithms [5] have been implemented, both with limited success. More recent approaches include using failure modes and effects analysis [6, 7] , fault tree analysis [8, 9] and a combination of both [10] . The successfulness of these methods has been variable as the system complexity increases. The method of digraphs has been used for limited multiple failures [11] identifying the potential for real-time automated monitoring and diagnosis, with improvement needed in the number of faults revealed.
With a limitation on the number of effective real time multiple fault diagnostic tools currently in the literature, this paper compares the most recent fault tree analysis and digraph based approaches. The differences between [8] and [9] are that the best approach laid out in these papers is extended to a larger system and the work considers system dynamics using flow pattern recognition. The approach can still obtain multiple failures and checks for consistency. With regards to reference [11] , this paper considers process variables not just component failure modes, and also process variable effects are considered. Reference [11] uses a more prognosis based approach for identifying weak links whereas this research using the method of back tracing. The evaluation of both methods is based on the application to an aircraft fuel rig system. The methods include the capability to evaluate multiple fault causes from a given system deviating state, inclusion of transient effects and analysis of dynamic system behaviour is considered, and both are adapted to include a form of consistency check for the results obtained. The work has the added originality of being applied to an experimental simulator which aids the validation of the results.
The remaining sections of the paper are divided into; section 2 explains each of the individual diagnostic methods; section 3 reviews the application fuel system in detail; section 4 considers the results obtained from the diagnostic methods when applied to the fuel rig for steady state and dynamic conditions; section 5 reviews each method, with section 6 reporting the overall conclusions to the research. This paper considers the diagnostic application of the fault tree and digraph methods.
Details of the fundamentals of each procedure are stated, with the similarities involving the comparison of actual and expected system behaviour. Application of these steps to an aircraft fuel system is detailed in section 4.
Fault Tree Diagnostic Method
Fault Tree Analysis has been around as a reliability assessment technique since the 1970s. It is concerned with the analysis of failures and provides a diagrammatic description of the various causes of a specified system failure in terms of the failure of its components [12] . Utilising the method for fault diagnostics involves the following steps:
Step 1 -Component and Sensor Identification Identify the components contained within the system and the failure modes of each. Identify the sensors contained or needed within the system to be used to monitor system behaviour.
Step 2 -Construct fault trees for observable system deviations
The behaviour of the system can be monitored by sensors located at specific points, i.e. flow meters. Fault trees are constructed to represent the failure modes at these locations, i.e. High Flow. Non-coherent fault trees are constructed that include failure and success states of the components, which removes inconsistencies between working and failed components. An example is given in Figure 1 to represent unwanted high flow at a valve (valve 1, shown in Figure 2 ). Using not logic one cause is because the valve has failed open, and hence it cannot fail closed. The valve has an inlet pipe and an outlet pipe (pipes 1 and 2), in order for flow to occur water must be available from the main supply and able to pass through the pipes. The necessary success events have been included in the right hand branch.
Step 3 -Determination of System Status
Compare the readings indicative of the current system behaviour with those that are expected given the mode of operation. Deviations are representative of faults present.
Step 4 -Diagnostic Fault Tree Construction
Construct a top event structure from the sensor deviations identified in step 2.
Combine all readings using an AND gate if there are more than one. Perform a standard qualitative analysis to obtain potential causes of failure.
Step 5 -Consistency Verification
Check the potential causes of system failure obtained in step 3 against the sensors reading true to the operating mode. Any potential causes of failure that could cause these true sensor readings to be false can be removed.
Step 6 -Fault Cause Ranking
In the instance of multiple fault cause options importance rankings can be used to determine the most likely cause of failure.
Digraph Diagnostic Method
Digraphs [13] can be used within engineering applications to represent the interrelationships between the process variables, such as temperature, mass flow and pressure. A diagram is constructed where nodes (or circles) are used to represent the process variables and edges (lines) are used to represent the interconnections, i.e. positive/negative influences. Nodes also represent component failure modes, whereby a signed edge connecting a failure mode node to a process variable node indicates the disturbance which the failure mode can cause. A simple digraph representation of a valve system unit ( Figure 2 ) is illustrated in Figure 3 . The valve unit is comprised from three components; namely, Pipe 1, Pipe 2 and Valve 1. Process variable deviations and disturbances [14, 15] within digraphs are expressed as one of five discrete values: +10, +1, 0, -1, -10, representing respectively; large high, small high, normal, small low and large low. An unexpected process deviation within a system is represented by 'highlighting' the respective node in the digraph. Subsequent propagation of the deviation through the system is represented by marking all of the nodes which were affected by the initial highlighting.
There are two phases to the diagnosis, initially the digraph must be constructed for the system under analysis, then this model is used to carry out the fault identification. The steps for digraph construction are:
Step 1 & 2 -System Definition and Unit Classification
Define system to be analysed and list all component failures. Separate the system into sub-units and identify and classify control loops, if present.
Step 3 -Digraph Unit Model Development
Generate digraph models for the sub-units taking into consideration all process variable deviations which could have an effect on the variables in the model.
Also consider the extent of the effect the process variable deviations may have on the system with regards to assigning discrete values to the deviations.
Step 4 -System Digraph Formation
Form system digraph model by connecting common variables from the subunit models. Once constructed the system digraph model can be used for finding the fault cause(s) by application of steps 5 to 7:
Step 5 -Identify Deviations Compare actual and expected system behaviour.
Step 6 -Flag Non-deviating Nodes
Identify the non-deviating sensor nodes on the digraph.
Step 7 -Back-trace Perform diagnosis from noted transmitter deviations to flagged non-deviated nodes or until no further back tracing can be carried out.
FUEL SYSTEM

System Architecture
The system used to test the capability of the fault tree and digraph diagnostic methods is representative of an aircraft fuel system. It is an experimental fuel rig, illustrated in 
Component Failure Modes
There are 43 different component failure modes considered in the analysis, which may affect the functionality of the fuel rig system. Table 1 
Monitoring System Operational Behaviour
The fuel system status can be obtained using the information from three types of sensors associated within the tanks. These are level, flow and pressure transmitters. Table 2 illustrates the specific sensors associated with each of the tank sections.
Fuel System Assumptions
In modelling the fuel system various assumptions have been made. A blockage whether in a valve or a pipe assumes a complete blockage preventing any flow of fuel.
Pipe rupture infers that the fuel will flow out of the rupture site and not along its intended path. A partial blockage (in a valve or pipe) refers to a partial stoppage of flow. A leak (in a valve or pipe) will result in some fluid loss yielding partial flow.
For the analysis steady state operation of the system has been assumed as well as reliable sensor readings monitoring the system behaviour (the consideration of dynamic behaviour is addressed in sections 4.2 and 4.3).
APPLICATION OF DIAGNOSTIC METHODS
Actual System Operating Behaviour
In using both methods deviations are considered from the normal expected operating behaviour of the system. In the active mode it is assumed that there would be flow Figure 5 ).
The corresponding sensors on the wing tank would indicate the same respective readings. The readings for the collector tank would also indicate required level, no flow to drain, flow to engine and pressure at both pressure transmitters. The expected sensor readings can also be obtained for the other operational modes.
To illustrate within the paper the diagnostic process, the actual readings from all the sensors within the system have been assumed to indicate a deviation within the All other readings conform to expectation.
Using The Fault Tree Method
To utilise this method a fault tree is constructed to represent the causes of unexpected system behaviour. The inputs to this diagnostic tree depicting the actual system functionality are the fault trees for the necessary sensor failure modes (step 1).
Considering the main tank, there would be three fault trees for the failure modes of the flow transmitter monitoring flow from the main tank to drain (FT0100), representing the causes of No Flow, Flow and Partial Flow. The same three fault tree failure modes would be constructed for the flow transmitter monitoring the state of flow from the main tank to the collector tank (FT0110). Each pressure transmitter (PT0110 and PT0120) would have three fault trees representing the failure modes High Pressure, No pressure, Partial pressure.
All fault trees contain failure and success events, therefore use AND, OR and NOT logic (referred to as non-coherent fault trees). The inclusion of the success events (or equivalent NOT logic) helps to remove failure causes that are not possible when more than one sensor failure mode are combined.
Given the actual behaviour of the system, deviations from the expected state is indicative of a fault or faults within the system. To establish the faults the causes are extracted by combining the individual faults trees constructed in step 1, representing the deviated readings, using AND logic.
From the assumed actual system behaviour (discussed in section 4.1) the deviated reading from the normal active behaviour involves the flow from the main tank to the collector tank (monitored by FT0110). The actual reading is No Flow, therefore the top event structure for the deviated state will involve just 'No Flow at FT0110', as shown in Figure 6 .
No flow at FT0110 is caused by either a failure immediately before the sensor, namely in the section of pipe labelled P117, or a failure on both lines 1 and 2 of the As the purpose of the diagnosis is to yield the failure events, a coherent approximation needs to be carried out (basically removing the success states) to yield the combinations of failure causes. Therefore the coherent approximation of the example prime implicant would be P102B.P109B. In total for this given system state there are a total of 292 failure causes for having No Flow at FT0110. To try and establish the most likely cause of failure importance measures can be used. The Fussell-Vesely probabilistic measure of minimal cut set importance has been used in this research. Each potential failure cause combination (cut set) can be given a numerical rating, with the highest rating being deemed the most likely cause of failure. This value is calculated by evaluating the probability of cut set failure divided by the diagnostic tree probability of failure. For this example, the single order cut sets rank first and second, with the pipe rupture cause being ranked highest due to its higher probability of occurrence.
In order to improve the accuracy of the results the dynamics of the system need to be taken into account. The diagnostic process follows the same steps as illustrated for the steady state case, although step 2 is modified slightly. In this step comparison of actual and expected behaviour occurs via observation of patterns from the sensors over time rather than specific values. It is only the shape of the sensor reading patterns that need to be identified. Fluctuations or noise is permitted within a certain boundary in order to account for small discrepancies in the results..
Considering the whole flight phase for certain operating modes has shown that the number and complexity of patterns is extremely large to deal with effectively. In order to overcome this, these modes have been split into 'sub-modes' that depend upon the level in the collector tank. For instance the ACTIVE operating mode has been split into six sub-modes, each indicating expected behaviour of the system for the given level in the collector tank. Table 3 shows typical patterns for the three tanks and M114(-10). In a similar manner to the procedure described in (4), back-tracing ceases at node M114 due to reaching the flagged section associated with PT0120.
The diagnostic results achieved through the process of back-tracing from the registered deviating node in the main tank digraph are illustrated in Table 4 . For the given scenario it is possible that either a single fault or multiple fault may have led to the registered deviation; the diagnostic results confirm this. In total there are 83 failure mode options; 2 single order and 81 second order. Final human intervention, with the ability to call on engineering knowledge and experience will target the most probable failure modes. The list of failure modes can be further reduced by changing the operating mode of the system and comparing the causes for any registered sensor deviations noted in the two phases. In the case of multiple deviating sensors, the diagnostic results for each sensor are ANDed together to determine the possible failure cause(s).
Taking into consideration dynamic system effects enables a more thorough system analysis. The suggested strategy is to analyse system behaviour at frequent intervals in order to perform diagnostics and therefore identify if the system has shifted from its normal operating mode. This involves monitoring the fuel rig system from data retrieved at a set sampling rate and subsequently determining if the system is in an abnormal scenario. There are now a number of different expected readings in the active mode determined by the level of water in the tank, which ultimately affects from which tank fuel may be distributed. The dynamic effects of faults are investigated through examining the tank levels, in particular the rate of change in levels.
Considering the same dynamic example as used for the fault tree method, based on the faulty scenario utilised in section 4.1, where it is assumed that the deviating transmitter readings remain the same between sampling intervals in addition to a recorded static tank level. The back-tracing procedure is identical to that Taking into account dynamic effects for the same faulty scenario allows for a reduction in the list of possible failure combinations. When comparing the diagnostic results from the previous section with the dynamic results it is noted that the number of fault causes listed is more than halved.
The use of the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance can also be used, like in the fault tree approach, to hone-in further on the most probable fault cause from the list of possible options produced.
DISCUSSION
Overall Performance of the Methods
The digraph and the fault tree approaches are noted as displaying a complementary perspective. Digraphs display the failure propagation route through a system whereas fault trees focus on a certain combination of events which can lead to the top event (noted deviation).
Both methods require diagnostic models (either a fault tree or a digraph) to be constructed prior to any analysis. In addition the similarities extend to requiring the difference to be calculated between actual system behaviour and that which is expected. With the large number of sensors throughout the whole system there is the potential for thousands of deviations from the expected behaviour. It has not been possible to test both techniques on all possible system state alternatives, however consideration of single, two failures and a collection of more than two failures has yielded encouraging results.
The main discussions on the fault tree method are in section 5.2 and for the digraph in section 5.3.
Fault Tree Review
To utilise the fault tree method requires the systematic breakdown of the causes of each failure mode for each sensor, in addition the derivation of expected patterns of behaviour. The generation of each of the fault trees is the major task in using this method. As the number of sensors increases the number of fault trees required similarly increases. Having generated these trees and patterns the method for diagnosis is very straight forward and easy to implement. This issue of scalability could be a factor with more sensors because as the number of deviations increase the number of inputs in the diagnostic tree increases. Within the aircraft fuel system application this has not been a limiting factor. With the modular approach applied under dynamic conditions (looking at the patterns at system level then sub-unit level then honing in on deviating sections) the issue of scalability is reduced as each stage is of a manageable size.
The results obtained from the analysis of the fuel system have yielded viable fault causes, although several options have been produced. Importance measures have provided one means to be able to identify the most likely cause. The current research has not considered faulty sensor readings although a method of using other system parameters such as flow rate and rate of change of height have been identified as a means to locate unreliable sensors.
Direct application of the method discussed in the paper to diagnose faults when the system is operating dynamically seems relatively straightforward by the use of considering patterns of behaviour over time. The difficult area is perhaps identifying the units for evaluation at each stage of pattern recognition. For this fuel rig example the division has been easily achieved.
Digraph Review
Digraphs provide a clear representation of the relationships between the system variables due to their close reflection of the physical structure of the system under analysis. To produce the model requires a thorough understanding of the system, however it can be developed from detailed engineering drawings. The full digraph for the application system is relatively large; nevertheless development is aided by the sub-unit divisions.
With regards to the fault diagnostics process, the method of back tracing using deviating and non-deviating variables, is relatively straightforward and can easily be The use of importance measures to determine the most likely fault cause for a given deviation helps to hone-in on the most probable fault cause. Current focus is based on investigating a mechanism to further identify the actual cause(s) of any registered deviations through consulting data documented by technical personnel in maintenance logs.
The issue of extending the method to more complex systems is plausible, as even large models can easily be handled by modern computer systems. The technique is also suited to handling control mechanisms and therefore provides the flexibility to perform fault diagnostics of complex systems.
CONCLUSIONS
Both methods have produced realistic results for steady state behaviour. With no difference in predictive potential for this application system the digraph method seems the most efficient (as consistency checking is done within the approach) under these conditions. The research for dynamic behaviour has illustrated a modular approach can be used during the application of the fault tree approach which means that the problem is solved in manageable step sizes, for the digraph method use of rates of change are applied to extend the original steady state procedure. Both methods are straightforward to apply once the models are created. The techniques have tackled the characteristics of multiple faults, transient and dynamic behaviour and considered consistency check for validation of results. The importance of sensor location to aid diagnosis is an area which may benefit both methods. 
